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TEXTUALISTS’ PERPLEXING USE OF 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT 
K.M. Lewis* 
Textualist judges, such as U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, are 
well known for their outspoken, adamant refusal to consult legislative history and 
its analogues when interpreting ambiguous provisions of statutory terms. Never-
theless, in administrative law cases, textualist judges regularly quote the 
Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, an un-
enacted Department of Justice document that shares all the characteristics of 
legislative history that textualists find odious: unreliability, bias, and failure to 
pass through the bicameralism and presentment processes mandated by the U.S. 
Constitution. As a result, judges that rely on the Manual in administrative law 
cases arguably reach inaccurate results that aggrandize the Executive Branch. 
This Note canvasses the possible explanations for this phenomenon and ultimately 
concludes that there is no principled way that textualist judges can reconcile their 
use of the Manual with their jurisprudential philosophy. In other words, there is 
no principled reason to rely on the Manual while simultaneously rejecting more 
traditional forms of legislative history. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The textualist critique of legislative history is well documented.1 Legis-
lative history and its analogues2 are not authoritative, the argument goes, 
because unlike the text of the statute, the history has not passed through 
the bicameralism and presentment process mandated by the U.S. Constitu-
tion.3 Textualists likewise argue that legislative history is often inconsistent 
and frequently manipulated for political ends.4 
                                                                                                                      
 1. E.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws 16, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann et al eds., 1997); Frank 
H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 59 (1988) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Original Intent]; Alex Kozinski, Should Reading 
Legislative History be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807 (1998); John F. 
Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997) [hereinafter 
Manning, Nondelegation]; see infra Part I. 
 2. For instance, the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
discussed in further detail infra notes 7, 30–32, 60 and accompanying text, may be consid-
ered analogous to legislative history. 
 3. E.g., Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 675 (internal citations omitted). 
 4. E.g., Kozinski, supra note 1, at 810, 813. 
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Given this critique, it seems anomalous that even the most ardent tex-
tualists use the unenacted Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative 
Procedure Act5 as a guide to interpreting the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA),6 especially given textualists’ refusal to use legislative history and its 
analogues in other contexts, such as when interpreting the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.7 
It is argued that the Manual is reliable and authoritative due to the 
“role played by the Department of Justice in drafting the legislation,”8 and 
because Congress arguably “sought to simply adopt the prevailing practices 
of judicial review at the time the APA was enacted.”9 A closer examination, 
however, reveals that the same textualist critiques of legislative history 
apply to the Manual.10 The asserted rationales for the Manual’s reliability 
and authoritative status are also applicable to the legislative history of nu-
merous other statutes and rules, but textualists do not resort to legislative 
history and its analogues in those contexts. Moreover, the Manual has not 
passed through the bicameralism and presentment process; worse, the 
Manual was published after the APA was enacted.11 Finally, there is evidence 
that the Manual may also offer a biased and politicized, and therefore dubi-
ous, interpretation of the APA.12 It therefore appears that textualist judges 
who rely upon the Manual are acting in an inconsistent or unprincipled 
                                                                                                                      
 5. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINI-
STRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947) [hereinafter MANUAL]. 
 6. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–706 (2006); see infra Part IV. 
 7. See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167–68 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(refusing to join majority opinion in its entirety due to the opinion’s reliance on the Adviso-
ry Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also discussion infra Part II. 
 8. Robin J. Arzt, Adjudications by Administrative Law Judges Pursuant to the Social 
Security Act Are Adjudications Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 22 J. NAT’L ASS’N 
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 279, 288 (2002) (citations omitted). 
 9. Christopher M. Buell, Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance: The U.S. 
Supreme Court Fails to Act on Agency Inaction, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 641, 645 (2006). 
 10. See infra Parts III–V. 
 11. Dean Smith, Lawmaking on Federal Lands: Criminal Liability and the Public Property 
Exception of the Administrative Procedure Act, 23 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 313, 321 
(2003). 
 12. John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 
119 (1998) (describing the Manual as “a highly political document designed to minimize the 
impact of the new statute on executive agencies”); George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: 
The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 
1682–83 (1996) (describing the Manual as “a transparently one-sided, post hoc interpretation 
of a done deal” that fails to accurately “present the true nature of the APA compromise”); cf. 
Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron has Failed and 
Why it Can and Should be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 790 (2010) (“[A]lthough the 
Attorney General’s Manual should be considered when trying to understand the APA, espe-
cially in those cases in which the Manual’s interpretation is contrary to the Executive 
Branch’s interests, it may be unreliable when it advances a pro-executive point of view.”). 
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manner; they should either refuse to use the Manual as an interpretive tool, 
or abandon strict textualism and treat all legislative history as potentially 
persuasive if sufficient indicia of reliability are present.13 
In Part I of this Note, I summarize the textualist critique of legislative 
history and its analogues. Part II briefly describes the APA and the Manual 
and also explains why the Manual may not be a reliable guide to the APA. 
Part III catalogues examples of textualist judges using the Manual, and 
explains why this phenomenon is anomalous. Part IV surveys several possi-
ble justifications for textualist use of the Manual, but ultimately deems 
them all unsatisfactory. Part V speculates as to why textualists utilize the 
Manual despite the apparent theoretical inconsistency. I conclude that there 
is no principled reason for textualist judges to consult the Manual but not 
legislative history proper. 
This Note is not intended to argue for or against textualism as an 
interpretive method generally; plenty has been written on both sides of that 
debate.14 Nor do I attempt to demonstrate whether interpretations of the 
APA that eschewed references to the Manual would produce normatively 
desirable or undesirable results.15 I merely argue that use of the Manual is 
analytically inconsistent with the jurisprudential philosophy of textualism. 
                                                                                                                      
 13. Some scholars have argued that textualism  
does not require the blanket exclusion of legislative history from judicial consider-
ation. When a party prepares a brief in litigation or a professor writes a law 
review article, a court is capable of evaluating the persuasiveness of the author’s 
contentions on the merits, even though that author may have an agenda. When 
the court examines a committee report or sponsor’s statement, its critical capacity 
is no less. The court must give serious consideration to the information found in 
the legislative history, but it must assess the persuasiveness of its representations, 
quite apart from the congressional source of the history’s assertions. 
Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 732–37. 
 14. E.g., A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, supra 
note 1 (containing an essay on the merits of textualism by Justice Antonin Scalia, relevant 
critiques by Laurence H. Tribe and Ronald Dworkin, and Justice Scalia’s response to these 
critiques); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 845 (1991) (defending judicial use of legislative history); William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 625 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, New Textual-
ism] (arguing that the textualist critique “is quite powerful but not completely persuasive”); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987); 
Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a ‘Legislative History’ of Agency Rules, 51 
HASTINGS L.J. 255, 266–74 (2000) (summarizing the conflicts between “The Textualist 
Critique,” “The Intentionalist Response,” and “Dynamic Interpretation”). 
 15. I do note that citations to the Manual will likely produce results that favor the 
Executive Branch in ways that do not necessarily match the intent of Congress when enact-
ing the APA, but I leave for future scholarly exploration whether or not this pro-executive 
approach to administrative law would be preferable. 
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I. TEXTUALISM AND THE CRITIQUE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY  
AND ITS ANALOGUES 
Textualism is a school of statutory interpretation with numerous high-
profile adherents in the Judicial Branch, including Justice Scalia and Justice 
Thomas of the U.S. Supreme Court,16 Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh 
Circuit, and Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit.17 Although there are 
arguably many distinct subgenres of textualism, each with their own inter-
pretive and theoretical nuances,18 textualism generally holds that judges, 
when interpreting a legal text, should draw meaning only from the “ ‘objecti-
fied’ intent” of the legislature as expressed in the enacted text of the law, 
rather than conjectures about what the legislature subjectively meant and 
intended.19 Textualists find absurd the idea that a collective body composed 
of ideologically opposed partisan factions could have a discernible, mono-
lithic “intent” that can be attributed to Congress as a whole, especially 
regarding the meaning of statutory ambiguities.20 The textualist method is 
aptly described by Judge Easterbrook as follows: 
We should look at the statutory structure and hear the words as 
they would sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable 
user of words . . . . The meaning of statutes is to be found not in 
the subjective, multiple mind of Congress but in the understanding 
of the objectively reasonable person.  
If this method yields no confident answer, we may put the statute 
down—the question is not within its domain.21 
Therefore, say textualists, judges should not refer to legislative history and 
its analogues when determining the meaning of a legal text. Legislative 
                                                                                                                      
 16. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist But Not 
Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1301–02 (1998) [hereinafter 
Eskridge, Federalist]. 
 17. Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 14, at 646–47. 
 18. See, e.g., Eskridge, Federalist, supra note 16, at 1306–08 (comparing and contrasting 
the textualist philosophies of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas); James P. Nehf, Textualism in 
the Lower Courts: Lessons from Judges Interpreting Consumer Legislation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 8–9, 
53–54 (1994) (identifying “four different approaches to textual interpretation” and claiming 
that the differences between “various forms of textualism” yield “highly unpredictable and 
inconsistent results”). 
 19. E.g., Scalia, supra note 1, at 16–18 (emphasis added). 
 20. E.g., Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 675, 684–86 (citations omitted) 
(“[T]extualist judges argue that a 535-member legislature has no ‘genuine’ collective intent 
with respect to matters left ambiguous by the statute itself. Even if Congress did have a 
collective intent, they add, courts act improperly when they equate the views of a committee 
or sponsor with the intent of the entire Congress and the President.”). 
 21. Easterbrook, Original Intent, supra note 1, at 65. 
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history has not passed through the “bicameralism, presentment, and veto 
provisions of Article I” of the U.S. Constitution;22 thus, “recourse to legis-
lative history improperly accords the force of law to statements that have 
not satisfied the explicit constitutional provisions specifying how a bill 
becomes law.”23 Textualists argue that consulting legislative history is not 
only unconstitutional, but also undemocratic and tyrannical. Basing “the 
meaning of a law” on “what the lawgiver meant, rather than what the law-
giver promulgated,” is analogous to the insidious “trick the emperor Nero 
was said to engage in: posting edicts high up on the pillars, so that they 
could not be easily read.”24 
Textualists also argue that “legislative history is often contradictory,” 
and therefore unreliable as an interpretive tool.25 The legislative process is 
inherently competitive and adversarial. Each legislator has incentives to 
sneak statements into the legislative history that support his or her ideolog-
ical agenda.26 As a result, argue textualists, judges can find legislative 
history that supports almost any proposition they seek to establish. In the 
immortal words of Judge Harold Leventhal, “consulting legislative history 
is like ‘looking over a crowd of people and picking out your friends.’ ”27 
A good example of textualists’ reluctance to utilize legislative history 
and its analogues is Tome v. United States.28 The U.S. Supreme Court based 
its holding29 in part on “an examination of the Advisory Committee’s 
Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence.”30 Justice Scalia joined the 
                                                                                                                      
 22. Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 HARV. 
L. REV. 1005, 1007 (1992). 
 23. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; Easterbrook, Original Intent, supra note 1, at 64 (“If 
we took an opinion poll of Congress today on a raft of issues and found out its views, would 
those views become the law? Certainly not. They must run the gamut of the process—and 
process is the essence of legislation. That means committees, fighting for time on the floor, 
compromise because other members want some unrelated objective, passage, exposure to 
veto, and so on.”); Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 675. 
 24. Scalia, supra note 1, at 17. 
 25. Kozinski, supra note 1, at 813. 
 26. The incentives are bolstered by the unlikelihood of getting caught. Oftentimes 
congresspersons have not read a pending bill’s voluminous legislative history, and thus 
cannot detect and correct alleged attempts to influence the judiciary. See Scalia, supra note 1, 
at 32–34. 
 27. Kozinski, supra note 1, at 813 (quoting Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the 
Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983)). 
 28. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995). 
 29. The holding of Tome is irrelevant for the purposes of this Note and is therefore 
not discussed. 
 30. Tome, 513 U.S. at 160. The Advisory Committee was composed of preeminent 
lawyers and legal scholars appointed to draft the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Advisory 
Committee Notes, which describe in greater detail the Committee’s intent and understand-
ing of the rules, are widely used by courts to interpret the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 
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Court’s opinion except for the Part “devoted entirely to a discussion of the 
Advisory Committee’s Notes.”31 Despite wholly agreeing with the Court’s 
result, Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurrence criticizing the majority’s 
use of those Notes. Although Justice Scalia first admitted, “I have previous-
ly acquiesced in, . . . and indeed myself engaged in, . . . similar use of the 
Advisory Committee Notes,”32 he then argued: 
More mature consideration has persuaded me that is wrong. Hav-
ing been prepared by a body of experts, the Notes are assuredly 
persuasive scholarly commentaries . . . . But they bear no special 
authoritativeness as the work of the draftsmen . . . . It is the words 
of the Rules that have been authoritatively adopted . . . . Like a  
judicial opinion and like a statute, the promulgated Rule says what 
it says, regardless of the intent of its drafters.33 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Tome illustrates both the theoretical objec-
tions and aversion that textualist judges have to legislative history. 
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S MANUAL 
A. Brief Overview of the Administrative Procedure Act 
The APA is perhaps the most important statute in U.S. administrative 
law.34 Enacted in 1946, the APA is “designed to govern both internal agency 
procedure and judicial review” of agency actions.35 Among other things, the 
APA establishes default presumptions regarding what procedures agencies 
need to follow when engaging in rulemaking and adjudication proceedings 
of various levels of formality, and what criteria courts should use to assess 
agency decisions.36 Along similar lines, the APA “affords interested parties 
                                                                                                                      
DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, EVIDENCE: CASES, COMMENTARY, AND PROBLEMS 6–8 (2d ed. 
2008). 
 31. Tome, 513 U.S. at 167 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 32. Id. (citations omitted). 
 33. Id. at 167–68. 
 34. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Respon-
sive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 254 (1986) (describing the APA as the “centerpiece of 
administrative procedure”); Shepherd, supra note 12, at 1158–59 (citations omitted) (calling 
the APA a “landmark” piece of legislation that “permitted the growth of the modern regula-
tory state”). 
 35. Duffy, supra note 12, at 114. 
 36. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006); Buell, supra note 9, at 644–45; Donna 
M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current 
Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 930 n.32 (1998). 
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the right to participate in an agency’s rulemaking process.”37 The APA also 
contains provisions regarding the appointment, discipline, and decisional 
independence of Administrative Law Judges.38 
B. The Attorney General’s Manual 
The Manual, considered “one of the most comprehensive and respected 
reports on the APA,”39 was “written shortly after passage of the APA in 
response to numerous inquiries about the intended meanings of various 
APA provisions.”40 The Manual “was originally issued ‘as a guide to the 
agencies in adjusting their procedures to the requirements of the Act.’ ”41 
Among numerous other things, the Manual attempts to clarify the differ-
ence between rulemaking and adjudication and to delineate what types of 
agency actions fall within each category,42 who may preside over which 
types of administrative hearings,43 the scope of various exceptions within 
the Act,44 and the extent to which courts should defer to agency discre-
tion.45 Additionally, the Manual explains that “the judicial review provisions 
of the APA were meant to codify” the administrative common law extant at 
the time of enactment.46 Because the Manual “was prepared by the Depart-
ment of Justice contemporaneously with the APA’s enactment,” the 
Supreme Court “has indicated that the manual merits interpretive 
weight.”47 Courts therefore frequently review the Manual when interpreting 
ambiguous provisions of the APA.48 Estimates indicate that federal courts 
have cited the Manual in roughly 250 cases since its publication,49 and 
                                                                                                                      
 37. Nagy, supra note 36, at 930 n.32 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706). 
 38. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372, 7521 (2010). 
 39. Catherine Zaller, The Case for Strict Statutory Construction of Mandatory Agency 
Deadlines Under Section 706(1), 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1545, 1550 (2001). 
 40. Smith, supra note 11, at 321. 
 41. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 218 (1988) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (quoting MANUAL, supra note 5, at 6). 
 42. Arzt, supra note 8, at 290–91 (citing MANUAL, supra note 5, at 14–15). 
 43. See id. at 307–09 (citing MANUAL, supra note 5, at 72, 132, app. B). 
 44. See Smith, supra note 11, at 320–21 (citing MANUAL, supra note 6, at 27). 
 45. See Zaller, supra note 39, 1550–52. 
 46. Beermann, supra note 12, at 790 (citing MANUAL, supra note 5, at 108). 
 47. John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 918 n.129 
(2004). 
 48. E.g., Steadman v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 450 U.S. 91, 102 n.22 (1981) (citing Ver-
mont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546 
(1978)). 
 49. A Westlaw search in the “ALLFEDS” database with the search terms “(“attorney 
general’s manual” “ag’s manual” “ag manual”) /p (“administrative procedure act” “apa”)” 
performed on March 19, 2011 returned 227 documents. Although these search results admit-
tedly include cases that only cite the Manual indirectly (e.g., citing precedent that quotes or 
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judges of all ideological and jurisprudential stripes have relied on the Manual 
to support various propositions in high-profile cases.50 
C. Questions Regarding the Manual’s Reliability 
There is reason to doubt, however, whether judicial deference to the 
Manual is warranted. As Professor Shepherd argues in his extensively-
researched article on the heated legislative battle that led to the APA: 
The legislative compromise that produced the APA built many 
ambiguous provisions into the statute. Each party to the negotia-
tions then attempted to create legislative history: to create a record 
that would cause future reviewing courts to interpret the ambigui-
ties in a manner that would favor the party. Conservative 
congressional committees published conservative interpretations. 
The administration offered its much different description in its 
Attorney General’s Manual On The Administrative Procedure Act . . . . 
Neither account may present the true nature of the APA compro-
mise. Instead, each account is a transparently one-sided, post hoc 
interpretation of a done deal.51 
If this assertion is correct, then the Manual is neither an authoritative nor 
accurate guide to the meaning of contested provisions of the APA. Given 
that the Manual was written to advance the interests of the Executive 
Branch, the Manual is arguably “unreliable when it advances a pro-
executive point of view.”52 
Similarly, there is reason to doubt whether the Manual accurately  
describes the preexisting common law of judicial review of administrative 
actions. Although the Manual asserts that the APA merely codified the 
common law, Professor Beermann explains that “existing law was so unclear 
on many important issues, especially with regard to judicial review of legal 
interpretations, that codification would have meant that the APA provision 
had basically no discernible content.”53 Professor Duffy goes further, de-
scribing the Manual as “a highly political document[,] designed to minimize 
the impact of the new statute on executive agencies,” and stating that it 
                                                                                                                      
cites the Manual), my experience running numerous searches for cases relevant to this Note 
suggests that this particular search is more underinclusive than overinclusive. 
 50. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S.Ct. 1696, 1704 (2009) (Breyer, J.); Norton v. S. 
Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63–64 (2004) (Scalia, J.); Darby v. Cisneros, 509 
U.S. 137, 148 n.10 (1993) (Blackmun, J.); Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 546. For a timeline of 
the Supreme Court’s use of the Manual since the 1960s, see infra note 148. 
 51. Shepherd, supra note 12, at 1682–83 (citations omitted). 
 52. Beermann, supra note 12, at 790. 
 53. Id. 
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“shrewdly characterized the APA provisions governing judicial review as 
merely a ‘restatement’ and thereby invited courts and the bar to treat the 
Act as something less than a statute, as subservient to judge-made doc-
trine.”54 Judicial reliance on the Manual for interpreting these provisions 
therefore appears misplaced. 
Moreover, unlike traditional legislative history, the Manual was written 
after, not before, the APA was enacted.55 This casts further doubt on the 
Manual’s status as an authoritative guide to the APA. Presumably, if a con-
gressional committee that sponsored a bill issued a statement subsequent to 
the bill’s enactment describing its understanding of the law’s intended 
meaning, even judges sympathetic to the use of legislative history would 
look askance at the document. As the Supreme Court once stated: 
[A]s time passes memories fade and a person’s perception of his 
earlier intention may change. Thus, even when it would otherwise 
be useful, subsequent legislative history will rarely override a rea-
sonable interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its 
language and legislative history prior to its enactment.56 
This fact makes the Manual look even more like a post hoc attempt by the 
Executive Branch to interpret the APA in a manner beneficial to its interests. 
In short, the Manual commits the selfsame sins that relegate other 
forms of legislative history to textualist hell. It has not passed through the 
constitutionally-mandated bicameralism and presentment process. Indeed, 
it was prepared after the legislation was enacted. It lacks sufficient indicia of 
objectivity, reliability, and probative value. It was prepared by an interested 
party with a large stake in the outcome of the legislation. The Manual 
seems to fall squarely within the crosshairs of the textualist critique.  
III. TEXTUALIST USE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL 
Nevertheless, textualist judges have often cited and quoted the Manual 
to support numerous claims about the APA’s provisions. 
For instance, Justice Scalia’s unanimous opinion in Norton v. Southern 
Utah Wilderness Alliance57 favorably quoted the Manual, calling it “a docu-
ment whose reasoning we have often found persuasive.”58 Justice Thomas, 
                                                                                                                      
 54. Duffy, supra note 12, at 119. 
 55. Smith, supra note 11, at 321. 
 56. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13 
(1980). 
 57. 542 U.S. 55 (2004). 
 58. Id. at 63. 
  
Spring 2012] Text(Plus-Other-Stuff)ualism 297 
another one of the Supreme Court’s prominent textualists,59 joined the 
majority opinion without objecting to the Court’s use of the Manual. It is 
worth noting that Norton was decided nearly a decade after Tome, in which 
Justice Scalia admitted that “[m]ore mature consideration” persuaded him 
that use of the Advisory Committee Notes on the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence “is wrong,” and broke from and chided the majority despite wholly 
agreeing with the Court’s final result.60 There is not much qualitative 
difference between the Advisory Committee Notes and the Manual; both 
were interpretive guidelines issued by an entity charged with drafting the 
law in question. It is therefore unclear why the Court’s leading textualist 
would cite one but not the other. 
Likewise, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Bowen v. Georgetown 
University Hospital cited the Manual to demonstrate that the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services’ litigation position was “out of accord” with 
the APA’s requirements, and referred to the Manual as the “most authori-
tative interpretation of the APA” and worthy of “great weight.”61  
Justice Scalia also quoted the Manual when he delivered the opinion 
of the Court in Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v.  
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.,62 which Justice Thomas  
also joined.63 Additionally, Justice Scalia favorably cited the Manual in 
his dissenting opinions in Bowen v. Massachusetts64 and Webster v.  
                                                                                                                      
 59. See Eskridge, Federalist, supra note 16, at 1301–02. I should note, however, that 
although Justice Thomas may accurately be described as a textualist “who has often . . . 
joined Scalia’s attacks on statutory legislative history,” id. at 1307, he “does not join Justice 
Scalia’s insistence that legislative history be expunged completely from public law.” Id. at 
1301 n.3.  
 60. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167–68 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 61. 488 U.S. 204, 218–19 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). Oddly enough, this same 
portion of Justice Scalia’s concurrence also favorably cites legislative history in the form of a 
house report. One might therefore counter that Bowen and the Scalia opinions that precede 
it chronologically are false positives—cases that represent Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence 
before he committed fully to the tenets of textualism—and consequently do not provide 
support for my thesis. Justice Scalia has not always exhibited the same level of aversion to 
legislative history and its analogues. See Tome, 513 U.S. at 167 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I 
have previously acquiesced in, . . . and indeed myself engaged in, . . . use of the Advisory 
Committee Notes.”). While this argument carries some weight, it cannot overcome the 
strong support created by Justice Scalia’s ringing endorsement of the Manual in Norton. But 
see Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 731–37 (describing that a few textualist uses of 
legislative history may be defensible, particularly “the use of legislative history to identify 
the events that precipitated the enactment of legislation,” but “only after a full and inde-
pendent verification of the accuracy and persuasiveness of its contents”). 
 62. 514 U.S. 122, 126–27 (1995). 
 63. Id. at 123. 
 64. 487 U.S. 879, 922 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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Doe.65 Justice Scalia similarly cited the Manual before his elevation to the 
Supreme Court.66  
Moreover, despite the fact that if an “opinion for the Court relies on 
legislative history in any way, Scalia will typically concur only in the judg-
ment, often with a pointed critique of the majority’s misguided reliance on 
legislative history,”67 Justice Scalia has also joined several opinions written 
by other judges that utilize the Manual.68  
It is admittedly true that Justices Scalia and Thomas joined all but Part 
III of the Court’s opinion in Darby v. Cisneros, which engaged in a lengthy 
                                                                                                                      
 65. 486 U.S. 592, 609 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Relatedly, Justice Scalia’s opin-
ions have also referred to other post-enactment documents penned by the Attorney General 
purporting to give agencies guidance in response to then-recent amendments to the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act. E.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 17–19 (1988) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (citing Memorandum from Ramsey Clark, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, for the Exec. Dep’t and Agencies on the Pub. Info. Section of the Admin. Procedure 
Act, at iv (June 1967)). Justice Scalia also joined Justice Kennedy’s unanimous opinion in 
National Archives and Records Administration v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 169 (2003) (citing Mem-
orandum from Ramsey Clark, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for the Exec. Dep’t & 
Agencies on the Pub. Info. Section of the Admin. Procedure Act 36 (June 1967) and Memo-
randum from Edward H. Levi, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for the Exec. Dep’t & 
Agencies on the 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Info. Act 9–10 (Feb. 1975), reprinted 
in H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations & S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., Freedom of 
Information Act and Amendments of 1974 (P.L. 93-502), Source Book: Legislative History, 
Texts, and Other Documents 519-20 (Joint Comm. Print 1975)). 
 66. See Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 67. Eskridge, Federalist, supra note 16, at 1306 (citing, as examples, Bank One Chicago, 
N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 283 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) 
(Scalia, J., concurring); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 519 (1992) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring); Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 67 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 
496 U.S. 617, 631 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97 
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., concurring); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344 (1988) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)); see, e.g., 
Carr v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2229, 2241–42 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., writing the opinion of 
the Court, which Justice Scalia joined except for Part III.C); Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 
U.S. 526, 528 (2005) (Kennedy, J., writing the Opinion for the Court, which Justice Scalia 
joined except for Part III). Indeed, Justice Scalia has gone “so far as to refuse to join a 
footnote of an opinion that he otherwise joined completely. This offending footnote merely 
said ‘[w]e give no weight to the legislative history’ and briefly explained why.” Eskridge, 
Federalist, supra note 16, at 1306 (citing Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 
1882 (1997)). 
 68. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S.Ct. 1696, 1704 (2009) (Breyer, J.); Lincoln v. Vigil, 
508 U.S. 182, 197 (1993) (Souter, J., writing for a unanimous court) (citing precedent quot-
ing the Manual verbatim). Justice Thomas also joined both these opinions. 129 S.Ct. at 1699; 
508 U.S. at 184.  
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analysis of the legislative history of the APA, including the Manual.69 
However, it is likely that their refusal to join this part of the opinion was 
due to its mention of other forbidden sources, including a Senate Judiciary 
Committee report, letters written by the Attorney General and his subor-
dinates to various congressional committees, and the legislative history of 
the 1976 amendments to the APA,70 rather than due to the Court’s reliance 
on the Manual. Indeed, in Norton, Justice Scalia cited Darby for the proposi-
tion that the Manual is “a document whose reasoning we have often found 
persuasive.”71 I have found no cases or scholarly articles in which Justice 
Scalia chides judges for their reliance on the Manual or recants his prior use 
of the Manual, as he did for the Advisory Committee Notes in Tome. 
Justice Scalia’s use of the Manual is perhaps the most striking example 
of this phenomenon, given his unflagging zealotry for textualism. He is 
not, however, the only textualist judge to write or join opinions that utilize 
the Manual. Judge James Buckley of the D.C. Circuit, another critic of 
legislative history,72 has joined opinions that cite the Manual73 and has 
consulted the Manual in his own opinions.74 Former D.C. Circuit judge, 
Solicitor General, and Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, who has au-
thored impassioned critiques of judicial use of legislative history,75 has also 
                                                                                                                      
 69. 509 U.S. 137, 138 (1993) (Blackmun, J., writing for a unanimous Court except for 
Part III, which Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas refused to join). 
 70. See id. at 147-53. 
 71. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63–64 (2004) (citing Darby 
v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 148 n.10 (1993)). 
 72. See Overseas Educ. Ass’n, Inc. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 876 F.2d 960, 974–75 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (Buckley, J., concurring in part, joined by Starr, J.) (“We find [the majori-
ty’s] references to legislative history unnecessary, and we cannot accept the use of these 
extra-statutory materials to place a restrictive gloss on the plain meaning of [the statutory 
provision at issue].”); IBEW Local 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 715–20 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(Buckley, J., concurring) (“When one undertakes to use legislative history as a tool of statu-
tory construction, surely the first part of wisdom is to remember that Congress is a political 
as well as a legislative body, and that its members will put the privileges and facilities of 
their respective chambers to political as well as legislative uses. Thus not every utterance to 
be found in committee reports or the Congressional Record may be assumed to represent 
statutory gold.”); Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 14, at 647.  
 73. 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1456 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Randolph, J., writing the 
opinion of the court). 
 74. Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 587, 591–92 (D.C. Cir. 
1989) (consulting the Manual and finding that it “contradicts appellees’ position”). 
 75. E.g., FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Starr, J.); see also Ken-
neth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 379 
(“[T]he benefits accruing from the use of legislative history are marginal when weighed 
against the potential for abuse and the enormous effort involved.”). 
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joined judicial opinions that favorably cite the Manual76 and has described 
the Manual in laudatory terms.77 Other notable examples abound.78 
IV. CAN THIS ANOMALOUS PHENOMENON BE EXPLAINED? 
Why, then, do textualists use the Manual when it shares so many of the 
characteristics with legislative history that they find odious? In this section, 
I canvass the five most promising explanations for textualist use of the 
Manual. All ultimately fall short.  
                                                                                                                      
 76. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. United States, 774 F.2d 1193, 1200 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(Edwards, J., writing the opinion of the court). 
 77. Ass’n for Regulatory Reform v. Pierce, 849 F.2d 649, 652–53 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(stating that the District Court Judge’s “opinion below aptly returned to” the Manual, which 
he described as “one of the original guides to judicial understanding” (emphasis added)). 
 78. Many judges who have expressed marked skepticism about the value of legislative 
history have nonetheless cited the Manual in their opinions. Such judges include (1) Judge 
Rogers of the Sixth Circuit, compare United States v. Cain, 583 F.3d 408, 418–19 (6th Cir. 
2009) (Rogers, J.) (“Divining anything from unenacted legislation is always a risky business 
. . . . ‘[T]he statements of individual legislators . . . during the course of the enactment 
process’ may not ‘expand[] or contract[]’ legislation when ‘the statutory text adopted by both 
Houses of Congress and submitted to the President’ is ‘unambiguous.’” (internal citations 
omitted)) and City of Cookeville, Tenn. v. Upper Cumberland Elec. Membership Corp., 
484 F.3d 380, 390, n.6 (6th Cir. 2007) (Rogers, J.) (“We are mindful of the limited utility 
and reliability of legislative history. In this regard, ‘the authoritative statement is the statu-
tory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material.’” (internal citations 
omitted)) with Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 679 (6th Cir. 
2005) (Rogers, J.) (describing the Manual as “persuasive authority on the meaning of the 
APA” and using the Manual to give content to the phrase “interpretative rules,” a term that 
is undefined in the APA (discussed in Part IV.A and footnote 90, infra)); (2) Judge Becker of 
the Third Circuit, compare United States v. Bowers, 432 F.3d 518, 522–24 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(Becker, J.) (“[O]rdinarily even the contemporaneous remarks of a single legislator who 
sponsors a bill are not controlling in analyzing legislative history.” (internal citations omit-
ted)) with Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1331–32 
(3d Cir. 1987) (Becker, J.) (quoting the Manual for the proposition that “nothing in section 
7(c) [556] is intended to preclude an agency from imposing reasonable requirements as to 
how particular facts must be established”); and (3) Judge Silberman of the D.C. Circuit, 
compare United States v. SCS Bus. & Technical Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 870, 878–79 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (Silberman, J.) (“Courts sensibly accord such ‘postenactment legislative history,’ 
arguably an outright ‘contradiction in terms,’ only marginal, if any, value. Post-enactment 
legislative history—perhaps better referred to as ‘legislative future’—becomes of absolutely 
no significance when the subsequent Congress (or more precisely, a committee of one 
House) takes on the role of a court and in its reports asserts the meaning of a prior statute.” 
(internal citations omitted)) with Conn. Dep’t of Children & Youth Servs. v. Dep’t Health & 
Human Servs., 9 F.3d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Silberman, J.) (relying on the Manual to 
define “policy statements”). 
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A. Possible Analogies to The Federalist Papers 
Perhaps the apparent inconsistency may be explained by analogizing 
the Manual to The Federalist Papers. Ardent textualists frequently refer to 
The Federalist when interpreting the U.S. Constitution,79 despite the fact 
that the standard textualist “criticisms of legislative history apply, at least 
superficially, to The Federalist,”80 just as they do to the Manual. Indeed, 
textualist judges have, on occasion, invoked The Federalist “to create a con-
stitutional limitation not apparent from the plain language of the 
Constitution,”81 which appears analogous to the impermissible use of draft-
ing history to render an otherwise clear provision ambiguous.82  
The phenomenon of textualists using The Federalist may not be as 
anomalous as it initially seems. Professor Eskridge has argued that a textu-
alist judge who spurns legislative history may still be acting in a principled 
                                                                                                                      
 79. Eskridge, Federalist, supra note 16, at 1301–08 (noting that “the biggest consumers 
of The Federalist and other pre-enactment constitutional history,” namely Justices Thomas 
and Scalia, “will not even read pre-enactment legislative history of statutes,” and that “the 
Supreme Court Justices most critical of considering pre-enactment legislative debates in 
statutory cases are the most insistent that ratification debates be considered, and often be 
decisive, in constitutional cases”); Scalia, supra note 1, at 38 (explaining that he consults The 
Federalist because “their writings, like those of other intelligent and informed people of the 
time, display how the text of the Constitution was originally understood”). For cases in 
which textualist judges heavily rely upon The Federalist Papers, see, for example, Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 910–15, 919–24 (1997) (Scalia, J., writing the opinion of the 
Court); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 221–23 (1995) (Scalia, J.); U.S. Term 
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 845–926 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by 
Justice Scalia); and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–99 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 80. Eskridge, Federalist, supra note 16, at 1308–16. Some of the criticisms of The 
Federalist Eskridge identifies are: “[i]f the collective ‘intent’ of the bicameral legislature is an 
incoherent concept,” then “the collective ‘understanding’ of an entire nation during a consti-
tutional moment must be even more so;” “The Federalist is not necessarily more reliable than 
statutory legislative history in discerning usable collective understanding, [but rather] in 
some respects, it may be less reliable;” The Federalist is, in some cases, every bit as ambigu-
ous and indeterminate as statutory legislative history and therefore suffers equally from the 
“look over the heads of the crowd and pick out your friends” problem. Id. But see John F. 
Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional Adjudication, 66 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1348–50 (1998) [hereinafter Manning, Federalist] (distinguishing The 
Federalist from legislative history). 
 81. Eskridge, Federalist, supra note 16, at 1311 (referring to Printz, 521 U.S. at 909–24 
(Scalia, J., writing the opinion of the Court)). “Printz is a high-water point for Scalia’s use of 
The Federalist, because the specific constitutional texts of the Commerce Clause, the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, and the Supremacy Clause supported the dissenters and had to be 
explained away.” Id. at 1307. 
 82. See, e.g., Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(arguing that legislative history should not be used to render plain statutory language am-
biguous); Overseas Educ. Ass’n, Inc. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 876 F.2d 960, 974–76 
(1989) (Buckley, J., concurring, joined by Starr, J.) (“As the Act speaks for itself, reference to 
legislative history is unnecessary, and we cannot agree with our colleague’s use of legislative 
materials to modify the plain meaning of the statute.”). 
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manner if he or she consults The Federalist Papers because “the open-
textured Constitution cries out for more context” than that needed to 
interpret most statutes, and “[l]ong-departed constitutional debaters had 
strong incentives to represent political consensus or equilibrium accurate-
ly.”83 In other words, constitutional interpretation is a qualitatively different 
task than most statutory interpretation; it is a context where the originalist, 
historicist strain of textualism triumphs over its trenchant semanticist 
critique of drafting history.84 
Obviously, the APA is a statute, not a constitution; thus, analogies to 
The Federalist may initially seem inapposite. However, many commentators 
have argued that “the APA is more like a constitution than a statute” 
because 
[i]t provides for flexibility in decision-making; it can be changed 
through interpretation without the need for amendment; its 
movements are more pendulum-like than linear. Its fundamental 
role is to shape the relationship between the people and their gov-
ernment, giving the government considerable leeway in carrying 
out the substantive laws that Congress has enacted, while at the 
same time providing the governed with a considerable degree of 
procedural protection.85  
If this is correct, then textualists may have a principled reason to rely upon 
both the Manual and The Federalist but not other forms of legislative histo-
ry: the Manual, like The Federalist, provides crucial interpretive guidance 
                                                                                                                      
 83. Eskridge, Federalist, supra note 16, at 1323. It should be noted that while Professor 
Eskridge believes the distinction between The Federalist and ordinary legislative history is at 
least plausible, he does not appear convinced that the distinction completely resolves the 
apparent inconsistency. Id. at 1316 (“I am not completely persuaded of the new textualist 
position even under this better line of analysis, but neither am I persuaded that it is 
wrong.”); id. at 1323 (“I am uncertain whether The Federalist, written long ago to a more 
exclusive audience, is the most appropriate source of constraint . . . .”). 
 84. See id. at 1301–07; see also Manning, Federalist, supra note 80, at 1355 (noting that 
“the leading textualists typically subscribe to premises of originalism as well”) (citing Scalia, 
supra note 1, at 35 and Frank H. Easterbrook, Alternatives to Originalism?, 19 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 479, 486 (1996)); Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 731–32 (“[T]extualists 
readily acknowledge the importance of statutory context in determining meaning.”). 
 85. Morrison, supra note 34, at 253; see, e.g., Sasha Samberg-Champion, How to Read 
Gonzaga: The Seeds of a Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1838, 1867 
n.195 (2003); Shepherd, supra note 12, at 1558 (dubbing the APA “the bill of rights for the 
new regulatory state”); Michal Tamir, Public Law as a Whole and Normative Duality: Reclaim-
ing Administrative Insights in Enforcement Review, 12 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 43, 51 (2006) 
(describing the APA as “a ‘quasi-constitutional statute’ whose foundations are in the Due 
Process Clause of the Constitution”) (citing PETER H. SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 53 (1994); BERNARD SCHWARTZ & H.W.R. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL 
OF GOVERNMENT: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 8 (1972)). 
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and historical context regarding an extremely important, open-textured 
document that balances the conflicting needs of flexibility and stasis. 
At first blush, this comparison appears attractive. The Manual, like The 
Federalist, provides interpretive guidance when the law to be interpreted 
does not explicitly provide an answer to a legal question. For example, just 
as The Federalist helps clarify whether it is constitutional to require state 
officers to assist the execution of federal laws by conducting background 
checks on potential handgun buyers,86 the Manual offers a helpful definition 
of “interpretive rules,” a term defined in neither the text of the APA nor 
the legislative history created by Congress.87 The Manual therefore appears 
to provide much-needed “[o]riginal context” for this “open-textured, ab-
stract, and process-oriented” term.88  
However, this analogy is convincing only up to a point. Many of the 
most persuasive arguments that purportedly absolve textualists of their 
reliance on The Federalist in the constitutional context simply do not apply 
in the context of the APA. “The best reason” to consult The Federalist but 
not ordinary legislative history is “the different incentives of the speakers”: 
whereas “[l]ong-departed constitutional debaters” arguably “had strong 
incentives to represent political consensus or equilibrium accurately,” politi-
cal actors who create statutory legislative history, such as the Department of 
Justice during the APA’s drafting, have the “countervailing” incentive “to 
bend future statutory construction toward their preferred, rather than the 
actual, political equilibrium on some issues.”89 As detailed earlier in this 
Note,90 there is strong evidence that the Department of Justice drafted the 
Manual in the hopes that future courts would interpret the APA in a man-
ner that favored the Executive Branch. Thus, it appears that even those 
textualists who consult The Federalist should have second thoughts before 
cracking open the Manual. 
Professor Eskridge also argues that, because “the Constitution is more 
open-textured” and “abstract . . . than statutes,” the “[o]riginal context” that 
sources like The Federalist provide “is more useful, and even necessary, for 
interpretation of such an ancient document” than it is for “more targeted” 
and “concrete” statutes like the APA, “most of which have been enacted or 
comprehensively revised in the last couple of generations.”91 Notwithstanding 
                                                                                                                      
 86. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 909–24 (1997). 
 87. Nagy, supra note 36, at 932 n.41. Since I have mentioned interpretive rules several 
times throughout this Note, it is worth noting to avoid confusion that jurists use the phrases 
“interpretive rules” and “interpretative rules” interchangeably. Id. at 930 n.32 (emphasis 
added). 
 88. Cf. Eskridge, Federalist, supra note 16, at 1302 (referring to the U.S. Constitution). 
 89. Id. at 1323. 
 90. See supra Part II.C. 
 91. Id. at 1302. 
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the APA’s “quasi-constitutional” status, even the APA’s most abstract provi-
sions92 are arguably not as notoriously open-textured as constitutional 
phrases like “necessary and proper,” “unreasonable searches and seizures,” 
“due process of law,” “cruel and unusual punishments,” or “equal protection 
of the laws.” Obviously, The Federalist does not address the meaning of all of 
these constitutional provisions; that would be a chronological impossibility. 
I mention them merely as a point of comparison to demonstrate that the 
APA is not so abstract that textualists would be utterly lost were they not to 
refer to contemporaneous historical materials like the Manual. The APA 
was enacted only a few decades ago and is therefore not an ancient docu-
ment that requires intense historical analysis to understand, at least 
presently. Unlike the Founding Fathers, many persons born before the 1946 
enactment are still alive; the political and linguistic culture of the time is 
not wholly out of our grasp.93 Textualists do not need to rely on the Manual 
to obtain an accurate historical picture of the APA in the same way that 
they rely on The Federalist to interpret the Constitution. 
Additionally, Professor Eskridge notes that “because statutes are easier 
to change than the Constitution, a judicial interpretation that slights legis-
lative expectations does potentially less harm than one that slights 
constitutional expectations.”94 In other words, because the costs of neglect-
ing to consult documents like The Federalist are so much greater than the 
cost of failing to refer to statutory legislative history, even those who spurn 
the latter are justified in using the former. Again, in this respect, the APA 
is much more like a statute than a constitution. The process of amending the 
APA is no more onerous than the process of amending any other statute.95 I 
concede that amendments to the APA are rare and unlikely given “that the 
APA is not a high visibility political issue,”96 but major amendments to the 
APA are not unheard of.97 Thus, an argument based on the cost of errors of 
failing to consult the Manual does not support the Manual’s use. 
                                                                                                                      
 92. Notoriously abstract provisions of the APA include section 706, which provides 
that a “reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and 
conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law” (emphasis added). 
 93. Cf. Manning, Federalist, supra note 80, at 1357–58 (explaining that the Constitu-
tion was written so long ago that the context The Federalist supplies “transcends anything 
that modern Americans could hope to replicate, even if they had the luxury and capacity to 
immerse themselves in constitutional history in a way that no judge does”). But see In re 
Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Legislation speaks across the 
decades, during which legal institutions and linguistic conventions change. To decode words one 
must frequently reconstruct the legal and political culture of the drafters.” (emphasis added)). 
 94. Eskridge, Federalist, supra note 16, at 1302. 
 95. Morrison, supra note 34, at 268. 
 96. Id. at 268–69. 
 97. Id. at 269 (“There has been . . . one major set of changes to the APA. Beginning 
in 1966 with the Freedom of Information Act, continuing in 1972 with the Federal Advisory 
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Moreover, even assuming arguendo that The Federalist and the Manual 
are perfectly analogous, it is not altogether certain that textualists are justi-
fied in using The Federalist Papers at all. The Federalist, like legislative 
history, may be described as “a piece of political advocacy, whose contents 
may at times reflect the exigencies of debate, rather than a dispassionate 
account of constitutional meaning.”98 Indeed, “in the struggle over ratifica-
tion, strategic considerations drove the contestants on both sides to minimize 
and to exaggerate.”99 Likewise, as mentioned previously, The Federalist 
shares many other characteristics with legislative history that cast doubt on 
The Federalist’s reliability as an interpretive tool. If this is correct, then 
analogizing The Federalist to the Manual would not fully resolve the textual-
ists’ dilemma even if the analogy were persuasive. 
For all of these reasons, a comparison to The Federalist Papers does not 
provide a convincing explanation of the Manual’s use by textualists. 
B. The Manual May Be Reliable When Its Interpretation Is Contrary to 
Executive Branch Interests 
According to Professor Beermann, although there are undoubtedly 
concerns about the Manual’s neutrality, the fact that the Manual was drafted 
with the Executive Branch’s interests in mind indicates that the Manual 
may serve as an accurate interpretive guide “in those cases in which the 
Manual’s interpretation is contrary to the Executive Branch’s interests.”100 
Presumably the Attorney General would not have conceded to those inter-
pretations if they were incorrect. This appears to offer textualists another 
possible justification for their use of the Manual: insofar as the textualist 
                                                                                                                      
Committee Act and concluding in 1976 with the Government in the Sunshine Act and the 
amendment to the APA adjudication provisions limiting ex parte contacts, Congress has 
opened up the processes of administrative agencies to public scrutiny. In addition, these 
sunshine statutes have altered the ground rules for resolving disputes between the people 
and the agencies. Although courts still grant agencies a substantial degree of deference, 
Congress has explicitly made agency decisions to withhold documents requested under the 
FOIA subject to de novo review in the courts, with the government carrying the burden of 
proof.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 98. Manning, Federalist, supra note 80, at 1339. It should be noted, however, that 
although Professor Manning believes that textualists should utilize caution when consulting 
The Federalist, he does not believe that The Federalist is totally off limits: “A textualist judge 
must never simply conclude that ‘the Constitution means X because this or that number of 
The Federalist said that it means X’ . . . the principled textualist must also ask whether a 
given essay, examined in light of all the surrounding contextual evidence, offers a persuasive 
account of likely constitutional meaning.” Id.; see id. at 1359–60 (discussing how judges 
should use The Federalist). 
 99. Id. at 1358 (quoting Alpheus T. Mason, The Federalist—A Split Personality, in 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 163, 168 (John P. Roche ed., 1967)). 
 100. Beermann, supra note 12, at 790. 
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critique of legislative history is based on a perceived lack of reliability, 
reliance on sources that resemble legislative history, but demonstrate great-
er indicia of accuracy in specific contexts, may be defensible. 
This argument also proves unavailing. Textualists regularly select 
quotes from the Manual that advance, rather than stymie, executive inter-
ests. In other words, textualists are largely consulting the parts of the 
Manual they should view most skeptically.  
In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, for example, Justice Scalia 
cited the Manual for the proposition that the judiciary only has the power 
“to compel an agency ‘to perform a ministerial or non-discretionary act,’ or 
‘to take action upon a matter, without directing how it shall act’ ” under 
section 706(1) of the APA.101 In other words, executive branch agencies 
retain wide policy discretion which section 706(1) only curtails when the 
agency has “failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to 
take.”102 This standard is clearly not contrary to the Executive Branch’s 
interests. 
Likewise, in his dissent in Bowen v. Massachusetts, Justice Scalia used 
the Manual to support his contention that a state could not challenge a 
particular federal executive agency’s decision in a federal district court, but 
rather could only bring suit in a claims court.103 Had Justice Scalia’s opinion 
carried the day, it would expand executive power by circumscribing the fora 
in which some agency decisions can be challenged. 
Justice Scalia also cited the Manual in a pro-executive manner in his 
dissent in Webster v. Doe.104 He quoted the Manual’s assertion that the APA 
intended “to restate the existing law as to the area of reviewable agency 
action” to argue that the decision by the Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency to terminate an employee was a discretionary act that could 
not be reviewed for compliance with either the APA or the U.S. Constitu-
tion.105 This opinion also would have granted the Executive Branch great 
                                                                                                                      
 101. 542 U.S. 55, 63–64 (2004) (emphasis in original) (quoting MANUAL, supra note 5, 
at 108). Section 706(1) of the APA provides that a reviewing court shall “compel agency 
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006). 
 102. Norton, 542 U.S. at 64 (emphasis in original). 
 103. 487 U.S. 879, 922–25 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I do not agree, however, that 
respondent can pursue these suits in district court, as it has sought to, under the provisions 
of the APA, since in my view they are barred by 5 U.S.C. § 704 . . . . The purpose and effect 
of this provision is to establish that the APA ‘does not provide additional judicial remedies 
in situations where the Congress has provided special and adequate review procedures.’ 
Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act § 10(c), p. 101 (1947) . . . . 
Respondent has an adequate remedy in a court and may not proceed under the APA in the 
District Court because (1) an action for reimbursement may be brought in the Claims Court 
pursuant to the Tucker Act, and (2) that action provides all the relief respondent seeks.”). 
 104. 486 U.S. 592, 609 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id. at 606–11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting MANUAL, supra note 5, at 94). 
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discretion had it commanded a majority. Moreover, the fact that Justice 
Scalia cited the Manual for its characterization of preexisting administrative 
law is problematic; as mentioned previously, the existing law “was so un-
clear on many important issues, especially with regard to judicial review of 
legal interpretations, that codification would have meant that the APA 
provision had basically no discernible content.”106 This problem compounds 
the criticism that textualists are citing unreliable portions of the Manual. 
Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co.107 represents another example of 
then-Judge Scalia using the Manual in ways that advance executive inter-
ests. He quoted the Manual’s definition of “general statements of policy” to 
establish that the Secretary of Labor’s enforcement policy was not “a binding 
regulation which the Secretary was required strictly to observe.”108 Again, 
this decision preserved the flexibility of executive branch agencies to give 
guidance to private actors without locking the agency’s policies into place. 
Justice Scalia is not the only textualist to use portions of the Manual 
that further executive interests. Judge Buckley quoted a provision of the 
Manual that explains that “[t]he fact that an interested person may object to 
such issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule does not change the character 
of the rule as being one” that exempts the agency from the requirement 
that a rule be published no less than thirty days from the date it becomes 
effective.109 A statement that a certain condition is insufficient to disqualify 
an agency from an exemption from the APA’s procedural requirements 
undoubtedly favors the Executive Branch. 
Admittedly, there are counterexamples. For instance, in Bowen v. 
Georgetown University Hospital, Justice Scalia’s concurrence used the Manual 
to establish that executive agencies cannot make rules with retroactive 
effect.110 This portion of the Manual provides an interpretation of the APA 
that cabins executive power, and therefore may be reliable enough to sur-
vive textualist criticism. 
That said, on the whole, textualists appear to use provisions of the Man-
ual that benefit the executive. Professor Beermann’s observation regarding 
the potential accuracy of provisions of the Manual that hinder executive 
interests therefore fails to satisfactorily resolve the anomaly in most in-
stances. 
                                                                                                                      
 106. Beermann, supra note 12, at 790. 
 107. 796 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J., writing the Opinion for the Court). 
 108. Id. at 536–39 (quoting MANUAL, supra note 5, at 30 n.3). 
 109. Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 587, 590–92 (D.C. Cir. 
1989) (Buckley, J.) (quoting MANUAL, supra note 5, at 37, in turn interpreting section 
553(d)(1) of the APA). 
 110. 488 U.S. 204, 218–19 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the Manual states 
that rules “must be of future effect, implementing or prescribing future law” (quoting 
MANUAL, supra note 5, at 13–14)). 
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C. Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine 
Conceiving of textualism as a nondelegation doctrine may provide an 
escape hatch for textualists who utilize the Manual. Professor Manning 
argues that textualism does not derive its justification solely from invoca-
tions of the bicameralism and presentment provisions of Article I, Section 7 
of the U.S. Constitution and the practical and theoretical critiques of 
legislative history.111 Textualists regularly rely on case law, dictionaries, and 
treatises (and, in the context of administrative law, agency interpretations 
of ambiguous statutory provisions112) as guides to interpreting specialized 
legal language, even though, like legislative history, these sources have not 
passed through the bicameralism and presentment process.113 Rather, textu-
alism’s ultimate justification may be the separation of powers established by 
the U.S. Constitution. To Professor Manning, textualism is best understood 
as a bar to legislative self-delegation.114 In other words, reliance on legisla-
tive history grants the legislative branch the power to both make and 
interpret the laws, a combination that separation of powers jurisprudence 
abhors.115 According to Professor Manning, “lawmaking and law-elaboration 
must be distinct so that legislators will have a structural incentive not to 
enact vague or ambiguous laws.”116 “[B]ecause all laws leave open spaces, 
legislation necessarily entails an incidental” and permissible “delegation of 
law elaboration authority to the agencies and courts that implement it.” 
However, if Congress is permitted to “effectively delegate law elaboration 
authority to its own committees or members,” then the “structural incen-
tive” to “resolve important issues in the enacted text” is “substantially 
undermined; issues left unresolved by a duly enacted statute will be clari-
fied in accordance with the views of actors firmly under congressional 
control, operating outside the constraints of bicameralism and present-
ment.”117 
                                                                                                                      
 111. Manning, Federalist, supra note 80, at 1338; Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, 
at 675. 
 112. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984). 
 113. Manning, Federalist, supra note 80, at 1338; Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, 
at 695–707. Additionally, textualists may also “embrace such sources” because “a reasonable 
legislator would have consulted them to determine the meaning of the law for which he or 
she was voting.” Manning, Federalist, supra note 80, at 1342. 
 114. Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 706–07. 
 115. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers . . . shall be vested in . . . 
Congress . . . . “ (emphasis added)); Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 711 (“[T]he 
federal Constitution includes measures expressly designed to give Congress imperfect 
control over those who implement, and thus interpret, its laws.”). 
 116. Manning, Federalist, supra note 80, at 1338. 
 117. Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 706–07. 
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This observation initially affords textualists some justification for their 
apparent contradiction. The Manual may be best analogized to a common 
law treatise,118 which Professor Manning deems an acceptable tool for 
textualists in certain circumstances.119 Unlike legislative history, the Manual 
was written by the Executive Branch. Even though the Department of 
Justice played an important role in the APA’s drafting, it did not adopt the 
role of a legislator per se, and it does not remain under direct congressional 
control. Thus, a textualist might argue, judicial use of the Manual does not 
amount to legislative self-delegation, because it does not afford the legislature 
the power to both make and interpret the laws. 
While judicial use of the Manual does not amount to legislative self-
delegation, it still appears to offend separation of powers principles as an 
example of excessive executive aggrandizement or encroachment. Some 
degree of delegation to the Executive Branch to interpret the laws is 
expected, necessary, and desirable.120 However, if the Department of Justice 
is allowed to affect judicial interpretation of duly-enacted statutory provi-
sions merely by issuing an official manual, without express congressional 
authorization to do so, then the Executive Branch has enormous power to 
unilaterally change the meaning of statutes in ways that benefit the execu-
tive. To be sure, executive agencies, as a result of their policy-making  
expertise, often receive judicial deference to reasonable interpretations of 
ambiguous provisions in the statutes they administer.121 That said, agencies 
like the Department of Justice have no interpretive authority over statutes 
they are not authorized to administer, like the APA.122 Additionally, the 
                                                                                                                      
 118. See Beermann, supra note 12, at 790 (“The Attorney General’s Manual on the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act stated simply that the judicial review provisions of the APA were 
meant to codify existing law.” (emphasis added)). But see the difficulties with characterizing 
the APA as codifying existing law discussed supra Part II.C. 
 119. Manning, Federalist, supra note 80, at 1352–54. 
 120. See Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 710–11, 725–26 (“In contrast with 
legislative self-delegation, the transfer of some policymaking discretion to agencies and 
courts is more readily understood as a matter of constitutional necessity, and as less amena-
ble to control through judicially administrable standards. To that extent, textualists tolerate 
executory delegation because it is preferable to the alternative—unchanneled judicial appli-
cation of an assertive nondelegation doctrine.”). 
 121. E.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986); Manning, Nondelegation, supra 
note 1, at 715 (citing Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft 
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 275 (1991)) (“The [Supreme] Court has sustained sharp distinc-
tions between conventional delegations of lawmaking power to administrative agencies and 
attempts by Congress to delegate power to its own components or agents.”). 
 122. E.g., William S. Jordan, III, Chevron and Hearing Rights: An Unintended Combina-
tion, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 249, 254 (2009) (“[I]t is well established that interpretations of the 
APA are not subject to Chevron deference.”) (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hick-
man, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 896–97 (2001)). 
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informality with which the Manual was drafted and released strongly im-
plies that the Attorney General’s interpretation should not be treated 
authoritatively.123 Consequently, under Professor Manning’s analytical 
framework, in which judicial reference to extra-textual sources implicates 
the separation of powers, judicial use of the Manual appears to grant the 
Executive Branch the mutant cousin of the unconstitutional line item 
veto:124 the ability to effectively alter the content of a law outside the con-
fines of the bicameralism and presentment process. Thus, conceiving of 
textualism as a nondelegation doctrine fails to excuse textualist use of the 
Manual. 
D. Some Textualist Use of Legislative History May Be Acceptable 
Some, including Professor Manning, have argued that one can still be a 
principled, orthodox textualist without adopting an exclusionary rule com-
pletely barring all reference to legislative history. Although one should not 
consult legislative history to divine an unexpressed legislative intent, it may 
be permissible to use legislative history to “suppl[y] an objective, unmanu-
factured history of a statute’s context,”125 as long as the judge first performs 
“a full and independent verification of the accuracy and persuasiveness of 
[the legislative history’s] contents.”126 Doing so would arguably not impli-
cate the same constitutional concerns that animate textualism. This 
argument is somewhat comparable to the analogy to The Federalist, but has 
some key differences. It is therefore worth quoting Professor Manning at 
length on this subject: 
If, for example, a statute codifies an established term of art, and the 
committee creates a historical document (the committee report) 
that recites evidence (perhaps the leading cases) establishing the 
settled meaning of that term, judicial examination of that evidence 
does not assign the committee the power to determine the meaning 
of the law enacted by Congress as a whole. Rather, such a commit-
tee report may simply offer the Court insight into the way in 
which any reasonable person, skilled in the legal arts, would have 
understood the relevant phrase, independent of the committee’s 
subjective understanding of statutory meaning. In those circum-
stances, the committee serves as a persuasive relator of statutory 
context, rather than the actual creator of that context through its 
own idiosyncratic expression of intent. And the resulting legislative 
                                                                                                                      
 123. E.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 124. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
 125. Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 731. 
 126. Id. at 733. 
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history may add substantial value to the interpretive process by 
supplying a well-informed, contemporaneous account of the rele-
vant background to the enactment. Because textualists readily 
acknowledge the importance of statutory context in determining 
meaning, such uses of legislative history should present little theo-
retical difficulty for textualist judges.127 
If the Manual had the same characteristics as these permissible, contextual 
forms of legislative history, then perhaps textualist use of the Manual would 
not pose theoretical difficulties.  
At first the analogy seems attractive. The Manual was written against 
a background of administrative common law that, to some extent, was 
purportedly imported into the APA. The Department of Justice sought to 
catalog, for the benefit of executive branch agencies, which administrative 
law practices survived the APA and which Congress found problematic and 
sought to excise. Thus, the Manual may merely be affording helpful histori-
cal context. 
However, forcing the Manual into this category appears akin to shoving 
a square peg into a round hole. The Manual does far more than merely 
capture the objective, shared understanding of terms of art or discuss the 
developments that led to the APA’s adoption for historical context. The 
Manual provides definitions of statutory terms of art, but often does so 
with such specificity that it would be absurd to say that “any reasonable 
person, skilled in the legal arts, would have understood the relevant phrase” 
in that manner.128 For instance, it is unlikely that “any reasonable person” in 
the 1940s would inevitably conclude that “[t]he phrase ‘foreign affairs func-
tions,’ used” in section 553(a)(1) “is not to be loosely interpreted to mean 
any function extending beyond the borders of the United States but only 
those ‘affairs’ which so affect relations with other governments that, for 
example, public rule making provisions would clearly provoke definitely 
undesirable international consequences,”129 and that “the exemption is not 
limited to strictly diplomatic functions.”130 This ultra-specific statement is 
an expression of legislative and executive intent, not an objective definition 
that would have been shared by all participants in the heated legislative 
battle. Indeed, the Department of Justice extracted this insight from the 
                                                                                                                      
 127. Id. at 731–32. 
 128. See id. 
 129. MANUAL, supra note 5, at 26 (quoting S. REP. NO. 752, at 13 (1945) and H.R. REP. 
NO. 1980, at 23 (1945)) (citing Representative Walter’s statement in ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. DOC. NO. 248, at 358 (2d Sess. 1946)). 
 130. MANUAL, supra note 5, at 27 (citing Representative Walter’s statement in 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. DOC. NO. 248, at 157 (2d 
Sess. 1946)). 
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legislative history of the APA, thereby doubly compounding the theoretical 
difficulty of textualist use of the Manual.131 A similar argument can be 
made about the Manual’s definition of “interpretative rules” in section 
553(b)(A).132 
Thus, the Manual goes far beyond “recit[ing] evidence (perhaps the 
leading cases) establishing the settled meaning of” statutory terms and 
“identify[ing] the events that precipitated the enactment of” the APA.133 To 
the contrary, the Manual fulfills the same functions of legislative history 
that textualists deem impermissible, namely the creation of context by 
interested participants in the legislative process. 
Moreover, the concerns raised previously about the Manual’s accuracy 
and reliability imply that the Manual would fail the “full and independent 
verification of the [document’s] accuracy and persuasiveness” that Professor 
Manning prescribes.134 Again, there is doubt that the Manual codified 
existing administrative law practice because there likely was no uniform 
practice to codify, and the Department of Justice had great incentives to 
manipulate the Manual’s contents.135 The Attorney General has performed 
the impermissible task of creating, rather than restating, context, and thus the 
Manual may not be conceived as an acceptable form of legislative history. 
E. The Manual as a Mere Corroborating Authority 
The final possibility is that textualists do not use the Manual as a con-
trolling authority; rather, they merely use the Manual to confirm that their 
understanding of the APA is correct. Admittedly, I have not come across 
any cases in which a textualist judge uses the Manual to override the inter-
pretation he or she would otherwise ascribe to the APA or joins an opinion 
that does so.136 Similarly, I have not found any textualist opinions in which 
the Manual is the sole authority cited for a proposition; use of the Manual 
is always accompanied by citation to precedent, learned treatises, and other 
statutes and is supported by some degree of independent analysis of the 
                                                                                                                      
 131. Id. 
 132. See supra Part IV.A. 
 133. Cf. Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 731–33. 
 134. Id. at 732–33. 
 135. See supra Part III. 
 136. See, e.g., Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 1700–08 (2009) (Breyer, J., joined by 
Justices Scalia and Thomas); Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004) 
(Scalia, J.); Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Newport News 
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 123–36 (1995) (Scalia, J.); Brock v. Cathedral 
Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 
182 (1993) (Souter, J., writing for a unanimous court, including Justices Scalia and Thomas); 
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 216–25 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 913–30 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Webster v. 
Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 606–21 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
  
Spring 2012] Text(Plus-Other-Stuff)ualism 313 
statutory text and historical context.137 Textualists are far from using the 
Manual to effect “the triumph of supposed ‘legislative intent’ . . . over the 
text of the law.”138 Thus, one might reply that this is all much ado about 
nothing. 
Such a conclusion would be incorrect. In close cases, arguably any 
amount of corroboration can tip the balance.139 Judges rarely, if ever, 
explicitly rest their holdings on a single dispositive source. Each citation, 
be it the Manual, The Federalist Papers, a case, statutory text, or the Advisory 
Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence, buttresses the overall 
architecture of a judicial opinion.140 As Justice Scalia himself has stated in 
another context, “ ‘[a]cknowledgment’ of [a particular source cited in a 
judicial opinion] has no place in the legal opinion of this Court unless it is 
part of the basis for the Court’s judgment.”141 In other words, every citation 
counts. Removing any single source will probably not cause the structure to 
collapse like a house of cards, but it will at least make the opinion more 
precarious. Moreover, the probative value of any individual cited authority 
is affected by every other corroborative or contradictory source before the 
Court; the landscape of sources must be viewed holistically. Judges there-
fore ultimately make an all-things-considered judgment, based on the 
totality of legal authority before the Court, where every citation in the 
opinion works in concert to affect the end result.142 Put differently, quota-
tions from the Manual arguably color the entire analysis and therefore drive 
end results more than the text of judicial opinions initially suggest. Relatedly, 
                                                                                                                      
 137. See supra note 136. 
 138. Scalia, supra note 1, at 18–23 (discussing Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 
143 U.S. 457 (1892), a case loathed by textualists for allowing legislative history to trump 
statutory text). 
 139. A substantial number of cases in which textualists cite the Manual were arguably 
close cases about which reasonable jurists could disagree. The Court splintered and/or 
reached a different result than the court below in: Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alli-
ance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004) (reversing the Court of Appeals); Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 
879, 913–30 (1988) (splitting 5-1-3 and reversing the court of appeals in part); Webster v. Doe, 
486 U.S. 592, 606–21 (1988) (reversing the court of appeals in part); and Brock v. Cathedral 
Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (reversing the district court). 
 140. Moreover, the judicial decision-making process is not a quantitative task; there is 
no objective scale on which a judge may place each source she cites and divine whether or 
not her opinion would be rendered legally correct by the addition or subtraction of any 
single authority. See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 
CALIF. L. REV. 1457, 1462 (2003) (“Though the classical legal theory of decisionmaking 
assumes a formal process, this process cannot be reduced to an algorithm.”). A judge will 
necessarily approach all available sources in a holistic manner. 
 141. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 628 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in 
original) (attacking the majority’s argument that “[t]he opinion of the world community [on 
the death penalty], while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and signifi-
cant confirmation for our own conclusions.” Id. at 578 (Kennedy, J.)). 
 142. See supra note 140. 
  
314 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 1:1 
although it is impossible to divine from the text of the opinions, citations of 
the Manual may have helped textualists attract nontextualist votes for their 
opinions. Thus, there is arguably no such thing as a merely confirmatory 
citation.  
Alternatively, even if one assumes it is possible for a source to be mere-
ly confirmatory, theoretical difficulties still arise. If it is acceptable to use 
the Manual as a merely confirmatory authority, then there appears to be no 
reason for textualists to break from opinions that use ordinary legislative 
history in a manner that purports to simply corroborate the analysis in the 
remainder of the opinion, as Justice Scalia did in Tome and countless other 
opinions.143 It seems that one should either use both legislative history and 
the Manual, or neither. 
A textualist might retort that, while his or her nontextualist counter-
parts use other forms of legislative history as controlling authorities even 
when they simply corroborate the accompanying analysis, a textualist uses 
the Manual because it merely “displays how the text of the [APA] was orig-
inally understood.”144 In other words, perhaps textualists use documents like 
the Manual in a qualitatively different fashion than the way nontextualists 
use legislative history. However, as Professor Eskridge argues, this distinc-
tion “amounts to little more than a language game.”145 Whereas users of 
legislative history are portrayed as “looking for a ‘legislative intent,’ which 
is labeled subjective and unknowable,” textualists using documents like the 
Manual claim they “are looking for an ‘original understanding,’ which is 
labeled objective and knowable.”146 “In practice,” says Professor Eskridge, 
“legislative history and [documents like the Manual] are deployed in similar 
ways: as persuasive evidence of original understanding.”147 
In short, none of these avenues offer salvation to the textualist who 
uses the Manual. 
V. WHY? 
Why, then, have textualists come to rely so heavily on the Manual 
while they spurn more traditional forms of legislative history? I offer sever-
al possible explanations below, but concede that they are understandably 
speculative. 
                                                                                                                      
 143. See supra Parts III–IV. 
 144. Eskridge, Federalist, supra note 16, at 1312–14 (quoting Scalia, supra note 1, at 38) 
(describing a distinction attempted by some textualists to justify their use of The Federalist in 
constitutional interpretation).  
 145. Id. at 1313. 
 146. Id. at 1314. 
 147. Id. at 1313. 
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One possibility is that courts have been citing the Manual for so long148 
that the practice has become ingrained in the judiciary’s collective uncon-
scious. Perhaps quoting the Manual has evolved into an unthinking habit. 
This explanation is not entirely satisfactory, however, for use of traditional 
legislative history was also a deeply-ingrained habit for practitioners and 
judges that was nonetheless broken by the textualist revolt of the 1980s.149 
It is therefore improbable, although certainly not impossible, that mere 
inertia continues to drive textualist use of the Manual. 
A more convincing possibility is as follows: because many (although 
not all) contemporary textualists are political conservatives,150 and because 
many (although not all) political conservatives favor strong executive pow-
er,151 perhaps textualists have not fully appreciated the ramifications of their 
use of the Manual because the pro-executive slant of the Manual152 confirms 
their instincts as to what the correct legal result should be in any particular 
case. This explanation would not necessarily entail that textualists are adju-
dicating in bad faith. Rather, it suggests that textualists view the Manual as 
merely corroborative.153 If the Manual suggested results contrary to textual-
ists’ perceptions of what the correct outcome of a case should be as a legal 
matter, they would arguably subject the Manual to greater scrutiny. 
A related but more controversial argument is that textualists are indeed 
acting in bad faith by capriciously abandoning their jurisprudential meth-
odology whenever doing so would produce ideologically preferable results. 
This theory suggests that textualists intentionally or recklessly ignore the 
Manual’s analogousness to legislative history, and therefore create an 
                                                                                                                      
 148. The Supreme Court, for example, has been regularly citing the Manual since at 
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 149. See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 14, at 621, 623–24. 
 150. See, e.g., Francisco J. Benzoni & Christopher S. Dodrill, Does Judicial Philosophy 
Matter?: A Case Study, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 287, 295 (2011). But see id. at 295 n.26 (noting the 
counterexample of Justice Hugo Black, arguably both a liberal and a textualist); Paul Kille-
brew, Where Are All The Left-Wing Textualists?, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1895, 1898–1900 (2007) 
(arguing that there is no necessary connection between textualism and conservative ideolo-
gy). 
 151. E.g., Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the Recent Turn in Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 51 DUKE L.J. 307, 310 n.12 (citing Christopher H. Schroeder, A Conservative Court? 
Yes, 1993 PUB. INT. L. REV. 127, 130–46). But see Molly McDonough, Pitching to a New 
Lineup, A.B.A. J. EREPORT, Feb. 3, 2006 (“[B]eing conservative . . . doesn’t necessarily mean 
that a justice will be ‘a handmaiden of a strong executive . . . .’ ” (quoting Bruce Fein)). 
 152. See supra Part II.C. 
 153. But see the difficulties with dubbing sources “merely corroborative” discussed 
supra Part IV.E. 
  
316 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 1:1 
arbitrary and indefensible distinction in order to produce results that favor 
the Executive Branch. Scholars of many ideological stripes have argued that 
textualists often abandon textualism when convenient in other contexts.154 
However, sophisticated theoretical and empirical accounts of judicial behav-
ior suggest that, while judges are undoubtedly influenced, be it consciously 
or unconsciously, by their political ideologies, they are ultimately con-
strained to some extent by traditional modes of legal reasoning.155 
Textualism, and the desire to remain consistent with it, provides such a 
constraint. 
Therefore, while it is possible textualists are simply acting in bad faith, 
the most convincing explanation is that textualists truly believe they are 
being consistent with textualism as they cite the Manual. It is likely that 
textualists erroneously believe that the Manual is qualitatively different 
from, and more akin to The Federalist or a learned treatise than, the forbid-
den fruit of legislative history. They are probably unfamiliar with the 
aforementioned articles that cast doubt on the Manual’s reliability. Thus, it 
is likely that the originalist strain of textualism leads them to view the 
Manual as a helpful guide to the APA’s original meaning. 
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CONCLUSION 
A. Why Does All This Matter? 
This phenomenon is more than a curiosity of theoretical interest. As 
discussed previously, the Manual presents a pro-executive slant that may 
not accurately represent the legislative compromise reached by Congress 
when enacting the APA.156 Textualism is derived from a model of the judi-
ciary as a “faithful agent[] of Congress” that “must ascertain and enforce 
Congress’s commands as accurately as possible.”157 Thus, when textualists 
utilize the Manual, they may be aggrandizing the Executive Branch while 
simultaneously failing to act as faithful agents to the Congress. This shifts 
the balance struck by the constitutionally-mandated separation of powers, 
and thereby may lead to different results in administrative law and policy 
than would otherwise obtain. 
B. Epilogue 
Thus, if a judge claims she is a textualist, she should be a textualist all 
the way down. She should eschew all references to legislative history and its 
analogues, including the Manual, which presents textualists with all the 
same theoretical and practical objections as more common forms of legisla-
tive history. Otherwise, she should confess her heresy and convert. This 
would not mean she would have to utilize legislative history blindly and 
unthinkingly. Textualists make excellent points about the reasons to be 
skeptical of legislative history as a guide to congressional intent, and even 
nontextualists have come to acknowledge these criticisms. Rather, our 
hypothetical judge would afford legislative history weight commensurate 
with its persuasiveness. Again, I take no position in this Note about which 
side she should choose as a normative, theoretical, or practical matter. Both 
sides of the debate make compelling points, which explains why the debate 
over statutory interpretation has raged on for decades. However, a textual-
ist judge cannot have her proverbial cake and eat it too; she must choose 
one or the other. 
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